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DOES INSIDER TRADING PAY? AN ANALYSIS OF TRADING AND TIPPING 
ACTIVITIES IN INSIDER TRADING LITIGATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The Concept of Insider Trading 
Insider trading is prohibited under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
(2012), and its implementing rule, Rule 10b-5 (Code of Federal Regulations, 2014). The law 
provides that, 
(i)t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange—(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, 
or any securities-based swap agreement [1] any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors. (Securities and Exchange Act, 2012)  
Although not explicitly defined in current statutes, various federal and state courts, 
including the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have developed and 
expanded on the forms, legal standards, defenses, and boundaries of insider trading (Anderson, 
2014; Kim, 2014; Murdock, 2014; Yeager, Wood, Nagel, & Mccarrick, Jr., 2014; Tsepelman, 
2015).  
Breach of Duty 
For insider trading to occur, the corporate insider must have breached a fiduciary duty to 
the corporation by trading on material, nonpublic information (Acoba, 1999;  Chiarella v. United 
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States, 1980; Dirks v. SEC, 1983; Malone, 2003; Silver, 1985). In one case, the Supreme Court 
described what has become known as the majority rule, stating that a director owed a fiduciary 
relationship solely to the corporation and not to the corporate shareholders (Goodwin v. Agassiz, 
1933). Special facts, however, sometimes create a fiduciary relationship between a director and 
shareholders, legally obliging the director to disclose material facts before trading on the 
information (Strong v. Repide, 1909).  Special facts existed in Strong v. Repide (1909) when the 
director and controlling shareholder of the company used deceit by hiring an agent to personally 
approach and purchase the shares from another stockholder, concealing his identity from the 
latter. Other courts espouse the minority rule, holding that directors owed a fiduciary duty not 
only to the corporation but also to the shareholders and hence, cannot profit by trading on inside 
information at the expense of shareholders (Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co. of America, 1916; 
Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 1930; Oliver v. Oliver, 1903; Smith, 1921; Stewart v. Harris, 1904).   
The law on insider trading was expanded to cover not only corporate insiders and tippees 
but also misappropriators who employ deceit in obtaining material nonpublic information (i.e., 
external lawyers hired to assist corporate acquisitions and takeovers) (United States v. O’Hagan, 
1997) and fiduciaries who trade on material nonpublic information confided to them by family 
members (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Rocklage, 2006; United States v. Evans, 
2007). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Dorozhko (2009)  further created a category of fraud by affirmative misrepresentation, holding 
that breach of fiduciary duty is a necessary element of insider trading only when deception is 
based on silence or nondisclosure but not when deceit is based on active misrepresentation, such 
as computer hacking. The Second Circuit remanded the case, saying that computer hacking could 
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be considered a deceptive device prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Rule 10b-5 (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Dorozhko, 2009).   
The case of United States v. Newman (2014) clarified the nature of the tipper’s breach of 
duty, the level of proof required to show such breach, and the standard of criminal intent or mens 
rea for the tippee liability (Malone, 2003; Silver, 1985; Strader, 2015).  The insider or 
misappropriator must knowingly act with the intent of depriving the owner of the information for 
his or her personal gain (Beeson, 1996; Dessent, 1998; Strader, 2015). A tippee or individual 
who trades based on material nonpublic information received from an insider-tipper is also liable 
under Section 10-b (Yeager et al., 2014).  Within the context of tipper-tippee liability, the tipper 
must disclose material, nonpublic confidential information for his or her personal benefit, 
“broadly defined to include not only pecuniary gain, but also, inter alia, any reputational benefit 
that will translate into future earnings and the benefit one would obtain from simply making a 
gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend” (United States v. Newman, 2014, 
p. 452).  For the tippee to be liable, he or she knows or should have known that: (1) the tipper 
breached a duty of confidentiality to the owner of the information for personal benefit; and (2) 
the tipper intended the tippee to trade on the information (United States v. Newman, 2014; 
Strader, 2015). 
Forms of Insider Trading 
 There are two categories of insider trading involving deceit by omission or nondisclosure: 
(1) “traditional or classical” insider trading involving a corporate insider who uses or discloses 
material nonpublic information and trades on securities for personal gain (Anderson, 2014, p. 18; 
Strader, 2015, p. 1428); and, (2) the “misappropriation theory” of insider trading involving a 
non-corporate actor who appropriates information from the owner (e.g., lawyer whose firm was 
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hired to assist the corporation planning to acquire another company) and trades on such 
information (Anderson, 2014, p. 20; Strader, 2015, p. 1429). Both classical and misappropriation 
forms of insider trading require that the actor must have breached a duty to the source of 
information by deriving monetary, professional, or other valuable benefits (Anderson, 2014; 
Strader, 2015). A third category of insider trading based on deceit involves affirmative 
misrepresentation, as in the case of computer hackers who hack into a computer system of a 
company to steal and trade on such information (SEC v. Dorozhko, 2009).  Insider trading based 
on deceit through active misrepresentation does not require breach of any duty to the owner or 
source of information (Strader, 2015).    
Legal Remedies against Insider Trading 
Several legal remedies are available against individuals or corporations suspected of 
insider trading: (1) government prosecution by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the 
criminal provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (2012); (2) civil enforcement 
action by the SEC under the same securities laws; and, (3) private shareholder’s derivative class 
action under Title IV, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2014).  Civil liabilities 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 include, among others, disgorgement to the federal 
government of the amount of profits or losses avoided and penalties not exceeding three times 
the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of the unlawful insider trading (Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 2012). Criminal sanctions under Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 involve fines not more than $5,000,000 or imprisonment not more than 20 years, or 
both, except when the defendant is legal entity such as a corporation, a fine not exceeding 
$25,000,000 may be imposed. 
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SURVEY OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Theories of Insider Trading 
Various theories are tested in the literature on insider trading, including anomie theory 
(Passas, 1990), control theory (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1991), opportunity theory (Makkai & 
Braithwaite, 1991), organization theory (Ermann & Lundman, 1978; Braithwaite, 1989), and 
neutralization theory (Bensen, 1985). Some scholars advocate using the rational choice theory to 
test the assumption that insider traders are rational actors who weigh the potential benefits 
against the costs of committing white collar crime (Becker, 1968; Coffee, Jr., 1980; Oberg, 2014; 
Posner, 1980).  Several studies analyze corporate crime within a deterrence/rational choice 
framework, based on the assumption that corporate offenders would be deterred by the threats of 
sanctions (Braithwaite & Geis, 1982; Chambliss, 1967; Oberg, 2014; Paternoster, 1989). 
However, some empirical studies have found no or weak support for the deterrence theory of 
corporate crime (Block, Nold, & Sidak, 1981; Simpson & Koper, 1992).   
Paternoster and Simpson (1996) counter that the lack of support for rational choice theory 
in prior literature is due to the focus on formal sanctions instead of other informal sanctions (e.g. 
public censure).  Paternoster and Simpson (1996, p. 553) explain that their choice model is a 
“subjective expected utility theory,” where the individual balances perceived costs of offending 
and subjective expectations of rewards and benefits. Individuals are also affected by the context 
within which they are employed, such as the characteristics and environment of their corporate 
workplace. Individual decisions to commit corporate crimes are thus influenced by perceived 
risks and benefits for themselves, for their firm or company (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). 
Their study involving 98 graduate students in M.B.A. programs and corporate executives 
attending a business school confirmed that decisions to commit corporate crime are significantly 
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affected by the “perceived incentives and disincentives of the act, the organizational context, and 
the moral climate of the firm” (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996, p. 568).  Respondents in their 
study were significantly more likely to report that they would commit an illegal act (corporate 
offending) if the act resulted in “direct financial benefits for the company,” such as higher 
revenues or if it “enhanced a sense of organizational pride or esteem” (Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996, p. 568). 
 Szockyj and Geis (2002, p. 274) tested “inferentially” Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) 
self-control theory in their analysis of insider trading cases, both civil and criminal, from 1980 to 
1989.  According to self-control theory, offenders, including white collar criminals, have low 
self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). People with low self-control are “risk seeking, short-
sighted, insensitive to others, and desire immediate gratification” (Szockyj & Geis, 2002, p. 
274).  They predicted, among others, that insider traders are: (1) more prominent in lower-level 
employment than in higher level management, since advancement in position requires higher 
level of self-control; (2) repeat offenders, engaging in insider trading more than once since they 
are risk-seeking; and (3) more likely to tip others since they are risk-seeking (Szockyj & Geis, 
2002) .  Their analysis found that 63.4% of temporary insiders tipped others (chi-square was 
significant at p<.001) and that defendants in the securities industry were more likely to be 
charges with multiple illegal trades (chi-square was significant at p<.001). They also found that 
compared to civil defendants, criminal defendants were more likely to have engaged in multiple 
insider trading violations (p<.001). Being in business or in some other occupation than the 
securities industry also decreased the odds of being charged criminally (p<.05). They also found 
that criminal defendants were more likely to have obtained profits in excess of US$25,800 
compared to civil defendants (chi-square was significant at p<.01). 
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McNamara (2015) analyzed insider trading law through the lens of evolutionary 
psychology. The author discusses Robert Trivers’ (1971) theory of evolutionary psychology, 
explaining that human evolution favors individuals who have a “propensity for altruistic 
behavior” or behavior benefiting a non-affiliated recipient despite being “apparently detrimental” 
to the performer of the altruistic behavior (McNamara, 2015, p. 276). McNamara (2015, p. 278) 
posits that human psychology is “finely tuned” to detect subtle forms of cheating, or situations 
where a partner “attempts to reciprocate less than the value of the act originally performed.” 
Because of difficulties in detecting subtle cheating, humans evolved a “complex psychological 
system,” wherein each individual regulates both “his own altruistic and cheating tendencies and 
his responses to these tendencies in others” (McNamara, 2015, p. 278). McNamara (2015) 
explains that there is strong condemnation of insider trading because of perceptions that it 
violates fundamental notions of fairness and involves cheating of other traders in the financial 
markets. 
Fehr and Gächter (2002) conducted an experiment that verified the existence of altruistic 
punishment. Their sample involved 240 students from the University of Zurich who were 
randomly assigned to groups of four and given a capital of 20 “money units” (“MUs”) each (Fehr 
& Gächter, 2002, p. 137).  They found that 84% of the participants punished a co-participant for 
insufficient cooperation at least once, and that 74% of the punishments were imposed by 
participants who made above-average contributions on those who made below-average 
contributions. They also found that the punishment conditions increased investments in 
subsequent rounds of the experiment. Thus, 94.2% of participants made higher investments in 
rounds with the punishment condition than in those without. The experiment verified the 
existence and effects of altruistic punishment— group cooperation remained stable in groups 
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where punishment was imposed compared to those where it was not (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  
Green and Kugler (2012) also found that respondents in case scenario surveys assigned more 
blame to tippees who traded on inside information than to the tipper who relayed the 
information, regardless of the tipper’s motives.  
Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws 
Extant literature analyzes the effectiveness of various methods of enforcement against 
insider trading (Dooley, 1980; Fried, 2014; Haddock & Macey, 1987; Henderson, Jagolinzer, & 
Muller, III, 2015; Heyman, 2015; Lei & Ramsay, 2014; Meulbroek, 1992; Reichman, 1993; 
Tomasic, 1991; Yadav, 2015).  Heller (2015) cautions that criminal indictment of financial and 
accounting firms have substantial and far reaching consequences on the business sector and 
economy.  He cites as examples, the corporate indictments of Arthur Andersen LLP in 2002 for 
obstruction of justice (due to its shredding of documents related to accounting services for Enron 
Corporation) and S.A.C. Capital Advisors LP (“SAC Capital”) and three related entities in 2013 
for insider trading from 1999 to 2010. The author argues that prosecutors should consider the 
inherent vulnerabilities of financial and accounting firms, which often rely on reputational 
goodwill when deciding whether to file corporate criminal charges. A mere indictment can have 
adverse consequences on these firms, resulting in massive layoffs, capital flight, decrease in 
revenues, and in certain cases closure of business. The author concludes that in certain cases, 
prosecutors should consider the appropriateness of alternative means, such as deferred 
prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, and other pre-trial settlement agreements 
to settle corporate criminal liability (Heller, 2015). When considering collateral consequences of 
an indictment, prosecutors must consider the impact “on all affected parties and the economy as 
a whole” (Heller, 2015, p. 795).  
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Oberg (2014) posits that criminal remedies and sanctions, including imprisonment and 
fines, are more effective than civil remedies. Criminal sanctions are effective because they have 
a deterrent effect on inside traders are who are both profit driven and risk averse (Becker, 2012; 
Kadir & Muhamad, 2012; Moohr, 2003; Oberg, 2014;  O’Connor, 1989; Silver, 1985; Szockyj & 
Geis, 2002). Criminal punishment is also more effective than civil remedies because it 
effectively conveys public censure through the shaming function (Eads, 1991; Kahan, 1996; 
Levi, 2001). Since insider traders have higher social standing than property or violent offenders, 
imprisonment has a greater deterrent effect “because humiliation brought about by prison 
punishment is felt more by middle- and upper-class offenders than lower-class ones” (Oberg, 
2014, p. 120).  
Contrary studies claim that criminal sanctions have no deterrent effect because the 
rational actor model of insider trading lacks empirical support (Langenvoort, 2007; Seyhun, 
1992). Seyhun (1992), for example, analyzed trading activities and enforcement actions against 
insider trading in the United States in the 1980s.  He noted that despite the increase of criminal 
fines to a maximum of US$1 million and prison sentences to 10 years, there was an increased 
frequency of large volumes of insider trading (Seyhun, 1992). Oberg (2014, p. 124) concedes 
that criminal sanctions may lack deterrent effect due to “ineffective enforcement of insider 
trading laws,” “low probabilities of detection,” difficulty of prosecution due to problems with 
evidence gathering, and the “high burden of proof in criminal trials.” 
Other scholars espouse the effectiveness of alternative remedies such as civil litigation, 
resulting in penalties up to three times the amount of profit or loss obtained as a result of insider 
trading, individual fines, and disqualification orders, such as barring the offender from further 
employment in the position that gave rise to his or her insider trading activities (Posner, 1980; 
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Spitz, 1989).  Civil litigation may be more effective due to lower procedural costs of 
enforcement and lower burden of proof in civil cases (e.g., preponderance of evidence) (Atkins, 
2013; Brown, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006). 
Pro-criminal litigation scholars of corporate crime assert, however, that civil litigation is 
not as effective as criminal litigation because civil defendants are often individuals who lack 
financial resources (Kahan, 1998; Robinson, 1996). Since civil damages and penalties are often 
directed against the corporate firm instead of the individual, the “deterrent effect of individual 
civil penalties is diluted” (Oberg, 2014, p.129). In addition, “excessive litigation” and “weak 
social stigma” of civil penalties further “dilute the deterrent effect” of civil litigation (Oberg, 
2014, p.129).  
There has been no recent study on insider traders and their trading and tipping activities 
within insider trading litigation.  The seminal work of Szockyj and Geis (2002) on insider 
litigation analyzed cases civilly filed by the SEC and criminally litigated by the DOJ from 1980 
to 1989. This article further expounds on current research by analyzing civil cases and 
enforcement proceedings filed by the SEC and criminally prosecuted by the DOJ from 2012 to 
2014. The analysis aims to explore the motivations for trading and patterns for tipping by 
corporate insiders and misappropriators. Civil and criminal proceedings are compared to 
determine differences or similar among parties to the proceedings and outcomes of litigation. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Two databases were used in this article to consolidate data on civil enforcement 
proceedings and criminal litigation filed against individuals suspected of insider trading.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) maintains a public database, containing all records 
of federal court actions, administrative proceedings, decisions of administrative law judges, SEC 
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opinions, trading suspensions, and all corporate filings and information regarding different forms 
of securities violation, including insider trading. A keyword search on “insider trading” yielded a 
listing of all enforcement proceedings litigated and settled by the SEC. The authors limited their 
analysis to insider trading enforcement proceedings litigated from January 1, 2012 to December 
31, 2014 (N=69). The WESTLAW database contains electronic copies of all published and 
unpublished court decisions.  For this, a keyword search was used to gather criminal cases on 
insider trading decided by federal courts (the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, and U.S. District Courts).  The search parameters required that the terms “insider 
trading” AND “criminal” appeared in the “main body” of the case and that only reported 
criminal cases filed and decided between January 1, 2012 until December 31, 2014 be searched 
for relevant cases (N=58).  The authors then read each case individually and determined that not 
all cases were relevant to the study, either because the case only discussed insider trading in 
passing and covered a different type of securities or financial fraud, the case did not contain 
sufficient facts to enable full analysis, or contained a decision that either affirmed or repealed a 
lower court’s decision, without discussing the facts.  Also, some of the cases were repeated 
because of the appeal process through the federal courts.  The sample of criminal cases deleted 
these, yielding a total of 14 cases.  The authors conducted a preliminary inductive doctrinal 
analysis (Nolasco, Vaughn, & del Carmen, 2010) to extract variables from these civil 
enforcement proceedings and criminal cases to determine variables to be coded for quantitative 
analysis (N=83). After conducting an in-depth doctrinal inductive analysis of the variables that 
were relevant for this article, the cases were then analyzed and coded for further quantitative 
analysis. 
 The unit of analysis in this study was the insider trading case. Following jurisprudence on 
Page 11 of 33 Journal of Financial Crime
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Crim
e
12 
 
 
insider trading:  
Type of case and type of defendants or tippers  
 The cases were classified according to whether they were civil or criminal. Defendants 
were classified according to whether they were: (1) corporate insiders (e.g., employee, officer, 
director) (Chiarella v. United States, 1980; (2) outsider who misappropriates (e.g., attorney) 
(United States v. O’Hagan, 1997); or, (3) outsider who makes an affirmative misrepresentation 
(e.g., hacker) (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Dorozhko, 2009).  
Industry of insider  
 The occupations of the corporate insiders were classified according to whether they 
worked in the: (1) health and pharmaceutical industry; (2) securities and brokerage industry; (3) 
engineering, oil, and chemical industry; (4) technology, media, or investor relations industry; (5) 
retail industry; or, (6) legal, finance, and banking industry.  
Breach of duty 
  The cases were analyzed to determine whether defendants breached a known duty to their 
corporations or source of information. Breach of duty was coded as 1 (no) and 2 (yes). 
Entity to who defendant breached duty 
 Entity harmed by the breach was coded as 1 (corporation whose shares were traded) and 
2 (source of inside information). 
Trading activity of defendant or tipper 
 Not all instance of insider trading involved a defendant who traded on the material, 
nonpublic information. In some instances, the defendant(s) or tipper(s) tipped others who traded 
on the information.  Since the authors wanted to examine the trading patterns not only of the 
tippees but the defendant(s) or tipper(s), the trading activity of the defendants/tippers was coded 
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as 1 (no) and 2 (yes). 
Tipping activity of defendant/tipper 
  Tipping activity of defendant/tipper was coded as 1 (no) and 2 (yes). 
Tippees relationship to tipper 
 In cases where the defendant/tipper passed material, nonpublic information to outsiders, 
tippee(s) relationship to the tipper were classified according to whether they were: (1) 
acquaintances; (2) business associates; (3) close personal friends; or (4) family members. 
Purpose of breach by defendant/tipper 
 The purpose of breach of duty by the defendant/tipper was classified according to 
whether the defendant/tipper: (1) received a direct financial benefit or pecuniary gain; (2) 
obtained a reputational benefit, such as enhanced goodwill of the business or trust from clients; 
or  (3) simply gave a gift of confidential information to the tippees (United States v. Newman, 
2014). 
Tipper's knowledge of tippee's intent to use inside information (tipper Mens Rea) 
 Tipper's knowledge of tippee's intent to use inside information was classified into: (1) 
tipper did not know that tippee would use the information; (2) tipper should have known that 
tippee would use information (negligence); (3) tipper knew that tippee may or was likely to trade 
on information (recklessness); or (4) tipper knew that tippee would trade on information 
(knowledge) (United States v. Newman, 2014). 
Tippee's knowledge of tipper's breach of duty (tippee Mens Rea) 
 Tippee's knowledge of tipper's breach of duty was classified into: (1) tippee did not know 
that tipper obtained personal benefit in exchange for disclosing information; (2) tippee should 
have known, had reason to know, or had a general understanding that tipper was disclosing 
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information for personal benefit (negligence); (3) tippee deliberately avoided knowing whether 
tipper breached his duty by disclosing information for personal benefit (recklessness); or (4) 
tippee knew that tipper breached his duty by disclosing information (knowledge) (United States 
v. Newman, 2014). 
Settlement with SEC 
 Settlement with SEC was coded as 1 (no), 2 (pending), or 3 (yes). 
Amount of profit, amount of settlement, amount of judgment, and length of imprisonment 
 Amount of settlement by defendant/tipper/s, amount of settlement by tippee/s, total 
amount of settlement, amount of profit of defendant/tipper, amount of profit by tippee, total 
amount of profit, and amount of judgment/penalty were all coded in US Dollars (U.S.$).  Length 
of imprisonment was coded in months.  
RESULTS 
 The data was examined to compare civil enforcement proceedings against criminal 
enforcement proceedings. The mean settlement by defendant/tipper/s, mean settlement by 
tippee/s, mean total settlement, mean profit of defendant/tipper, mean profit by tippee, mean total 
profit, and mean amount of judgment/penalty were compared between civil and criminal 
defendants. Trading activities of the defendant tipper were examined to determine motivations of 
the defendant/tipper for breaching a known duty to either the corporation-employer or the source 
of inside information. Finally, tipping activities of the defendant/tipper wer  further analyzed to 
determine the tippees’ relationship to the tipper. 
Type of Insider Trader 
 Comparison of civil enforcement and criminal proceedings show that more than half of 
the defendants in both cases (52% of civil defendants and 57% of criminal defendants) were 
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corporate insiders (e.g. director, officer, employee) who worked directly for the corporation from 
whom the material, nonpublic information was obtained and either traded on or passed to others 
(see Table 1). Less than half of the defendants (46% of civil cases and 42% of criminal 
defendants) were outsiders who misappropriated information.  
Industry of Insider 
 Defendants belonging to the legal, finance, and banking industry constitute almost half 
(42.9%) of the criminal defendants and approximately a third (29%) of the civil defendants. 
More than a quarter of the perpetrators of insider trading also come from the technology, media, 
and investor relations industry (28.6% of criminal defendants and 27.5% of civil defendants). A 
growing number of civil defendants come from the health and pharmaceutical industry (14.3% of 
criminal defendants and 21.7% of civil defendants). Members of the securities and brokerage 
industry constituted 14.3% of criminal defendants and 10% of civil defendants. Only 7% of the 
civil defendants belonged to the engineering, oil, and chemical industry. The findings are in 
contrast to the study of Szockyj and Geis (2002) who found that one-third of all defendants (civil 
and criminal) came from the business sector, whereas only 18.2% came from the securities 
industry.  
Comparison of the figures in Table 1 also show that civil cases are more often resorted to 
instead of criminal cases against members of the health and pharmaceutical industry (21.7% of 
civil defendants compared to 14.3% of criminal defendants), engineering, oil, and chemical 
industry (7.2% of civil defendants compared to 0% of criminal defendants), and retail industry 
(4.3% of civil defendants compared to 0% of criminal defendants).  In contrast, criminal cases 
are more often resorted against members of the: (1) legal, finance, and banking industry (“legal 
and financial services”); (2) technology, media, and investor relations industry (“technology and 
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communications”); and (3) securities and brokerage industry (“securities and brokerage”). The 
SEC and DOJ have discretion on whether to file civil enforcement proceedings or criminal cases 
against defendants of insider trading. Criminal cases may be the predominant legal actions 
against members of professions that are perceived to be more accountable due to their 
specialized knowledge of, and the nature of their position in, the financial and economic sector.  
Individuals employed in legal and financial services, technology and communications, and 
securities and brokerage are presumably more aware and familiar with economic, financial, and 
securities laws, rules and regulations. On the other hand, industries such as the health and 
pharmaceutical industry, the engineering, oil, and chemical industry, and the retail industry do 
not directly deal with securities and finance but with other aspects of the market economy, such 
as production and manufacturing.  
Breach of Duty and Entity Harmed by Breach 
Almost all civil (97.1%) and all criminal defendants (100%) breached a known duty by 
trading on material nonpublic information or disclosing such information to other tippees who 
proceeded to trade for their personal gain. Half of the civil defendants (50%) and more than half 
of the criminal defendants (64.3%) breached their duty to their corporation, while half  of the 
civil defendants (50%) and more than a third of the criminal defendants (35.7%) breached their 
duty to the source of information (e.g., law firm)   
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Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
Trading Activities of Insider 
 Insider trading covers scenarios where the corporate insider does not himself trade but 
passes material nonpublic information to an outsider who trades on the information. The insider 
who does not trade and the tippee who trades are both liable under current insider trading laws. 
About 60.9% of the civil defendants and 64.3% of the criminal defendants traded on the 
information.  
Liability under current insider trading laws, however, requires that the tipper must 
disclose material, nonpublic confidential information for his or her personal benefit, “broadly 
defined to include not only pecuniary gain, but also, inter alia, any reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings and the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend” (United States v. Newman, 2014, p. 452).    
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
Table 2 shows that a defendant in a civil or criminal insider trading case is more likely to 
trade on the information and breach his or her duty when he receives a direct, financial benefit in 
the form of pecuniary gain, and is less likely to trade on the information when he merely receives 
a reputational benefit, such as increased goodwill, that does not translate into any financial 
reward or when he gives a gift of confidential information to another individual who trades on 
the information (chi-square is significant at the p<.001) . Although the defendant does not trade 
on the material nonpublic information due to the lack of financial benefits, he passes the 
information to another to enhance his reputation or as a gift to the recipient. The information is 
used by the tippee who illegally trades at the expense of the corporation. Under current laws, the 
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tippee is similarly liable if he or she knows or should have known that: (1) the tipper breached a 
duty of confidentiality to the owner of the information for personal benefit; and (2) the tipper 
intended the tippee to trade on the information (United States v. Newman, 2014; Strader, 2015).  
Tipper’s Knowledge of Tippee’s Intent to Use Inside Information (Mens Rea) 
 The requisite tipper’s men’s rea was present in both civil and criminal cases (see Table 
1). In civil cases 87% of the defendants knew that the tippee would trade on the information. In 
criminal cases, 91.7% of the defendants knew that the tippee would trade on the information. 
Only less than 10% of the civil and criminal defendants did not know that the tippee would use 
and trade on the information.   
Tippee’s Knowledge of Tipper’s Breach of Duty 
 Approximately three-fourths of civil defendants who were tippees and 90.7% of criminal 
defendant-tippees knew that their tippers breached a duty of confidentiality to their corporate 
employers or the source of information (see Table 1). None of the civil defendant-tippees and 
less than 10% of the criminal defendant-tippees did not know that their tippers breached a duty 
of confidentiality.  
Tipping Activity and Tipper-Tippee Relationship  
 Table 1 shows that more than three-fourths of both civil (76.8%) and criminal (78.6) 
defendants tipped others on the material nonpublic information. Almost half of the tippees in 
civil proceedings were close personal friends, 33% were business associates, and 17% were 
family members.  On the other hand, almost 60% of the tippees in criminal proceedings were 
business associates while only 40% were close personal friends.  In both civil and criminal cases, 
Table 3 shows that the defendant-tipper was more likely to pass on the information to a tippee 
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who was a close personal friend, business associate, or family member (chi-square is significant 
at the p<.01). 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
Amount of Profit and Settlement  
Table 4 shows the results of an independent samples t-test comparison of means for civil 
enforcement and criminal litigation proceedings. There was a statistically significant difference 
in the amount of profits obtained by defendants in civil (M=$5,126,254.60; SD=$21,203,083.40) 
and criminal cases (M=$27,107,391.40; SD=$22,541,772.00; t (43)= -2.172, p<.035 two-tailed). 
The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference= $-21,981,136.79) was moderate 
to large (eta squared = 0.989). The total amount of profits obtained by tippers and tippees also 
significantly differed between civil (M=$11,250,063.74; SD=$47,413,166.16) and criminal cases 
(M=$43,961,451.70; SD=$75,909,643.75; t (75)= -2.028, p<.046 two-tailed). The magnitude of 
the difference in the means (mean difference= $--32,711,387.95) was moderate (eta squared = 
0.052).  The amount of settlement of civil defendant-tippees (M=$4,141,626.23; SD=$8,724,368) 
also significantly differed from criminal defendant-tippees (M=$33,020,825.00; t (22)= -3.240, 
p<.004 two-tailed).  The magnitude of the mean difference ($-28879198.76) was large (eta 
squared = 0.32).   
 
Insert Table 4 Here 
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Criminal proceedings involved defendants who made more profits compared to civil 
defendants. At the same time, the amount of settlement of tippee-defendants in criminal 
proceedings was more than the amount of settlement paid by civil tippee-defendants.  
CONCLUSION 
 Results of the article show support for the rational choice theory of crime.  First, a 
defendant in a civil or criminal insider trading case is more likely to trade on the information 
when he receives a direct, financial benefit from breaching his duty of confidentiality. However, 
he is less likely to trade on the information when he merely receives a reputational benefit, such 
as increased goodwill, that does not translate into any financial reward or when he gives a gift of 
confidential information to another individual who trades on the information (chi-square 
significant p<.001). Second, the defendant-tipper was more likely to pass on the information to a 
tippee who was a close personal friend, business associate, or family member (chi-square 
significant p<.01). Almost half of the tippees in civil proceedings were close personal friends 
(49%), business associates (32.7%), or family members (16.4%).  Almost 60% of tippees in 
criminal proceedings were business associates or close personal friends (41.7%).  The average 
amount of profit of a defendant tipper (in both civil and criminal proceedings) was 
$4,103,459.53, while the average amount of his or her settlement with the SEC was only 
$602,252.09. On the other hand, the average amount of profit of a defendant tippee tipper (in 
both civil and criminal proceedings) was $11,855,900.31, while the average amount of his or her 
settlement with the SEC was only $1,545,520.82. 
Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) rational choice model explains that an individual’s 
decision to offend is based on a balancing of the subjective expectations of rewards and benefits 
against the perceived costs of offending. Individual decisions to commit corporate crimes are 
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also influenced by perceived benefits not only for themselves but also for their firm or company 
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Respondents in their study were significantly more likely to 
report that they would commit an illegal act (corporate offending) if the act resulted in “direct 
financial benefits for the company” such as higher revenues or if it “enhanced a sense of 
organizational pride or esteem” (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996, p. 568). While insider trading 
defendants were more likely to trade on material nonpublic information if the purpose of their 
breach of confidential duty resulted in financial gain, they were also likely to tip close personal 
friends, business associates, or family members. Their tipping activities are not motivated by 
altruistic motives because they receive benefits in the form of increased reputation and goodwill. 
At the same time, their tippees have also benefitted through the act of tipping by obtaining 
massive amounts of profit. The individual’s decision to engage in insider trading is not only 
based on perceived benefits to himself but also on perceived gains to his firm (by passing on 
information to business associates), his close personal friends (who give him either financial 
benefits in kind or regard him highly for his gift of confidential information), or his family 
members. In all instances, the choice is still based on a rational calculation of perceived gains for 
him and his close circle of family, friends, and business associates. 
 This article adds to the growing literature by offering a perspective of insider trading 
based on rational calculations of benefits not only to the individual defendant but also perceived 
benefits to his family and associates. Although the threat of civil enforcement and criminal 
proceedings may possibly deter him or her from committing the crime, results indicate that the 
amount of settlement in both instances are considerably lower than the amount of profits 
obtained from the offense. A weakness of this study lies in analysis of a limited time frame of 
three years of insider trading litigation (2012-2014). Also, securities class actions (derivative 
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shareholders suit) were not analyzed. In securities class action litigation, the plaintiff is not the 
SEC and the litigator is not the DOJ. Private shareholders file civil actions against the company 
who they perceive are liable for insider trading. Since private shareholders suit employ private 
lawyers to litigate the action, it is possible that the amount of settlement may be larger than in 
SEC civil enforcement actions or in DOJ-prosecuted criminal cases. Future studies may also 
examine a larger sample, covering a longer period of time, with multivariate statistics. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Securities and Exchange Commission Civil Enforcement Proceedings and Securities 
Fraud Criminal Litigation from 2012-2014 (N=83) 
Variables Civil Enforcement 
(N=69) 
Criminal Litigation 
(N=14) 
Type of defendant or tipper   
Corporate Insider (e.g. employee, officer, director) 36 (52.2%) 8 (57.1%) 
Outsider who misappropriates (e.g. lawyer, outside consultant) 32 (46.4%) 6 (42.9%) 
Outsider who makes affirmative misrepresentation (e.g., hacker)  1 (1.4%) 0 (0%) 
Industry of insider   
Health and pharmaceutical industry 15 (21.7%) 2 (14.3%) 
Securities and brokerage industry 7 (10.1%) 2 (14.3%) 
Engineering, oil, and chemical industry 5 (7.2%) 0 (0%) 
Technology, media, investor relations industry 19 (27.5%) 4 (28.6%) 
Retail industry 3 (4.3%) 0 (0%) 
Legal, finance, and banking industry 20 (29%) 6 (42.9%) 
Breach of duty   
Yes 67 (97.1%) 14 (100%) 
No   2 (2.9%)   0 (0%) 
Entity to whom defendant or tipper breached duty   
Corporation whose shares were traded 34 (50%) 9 (64.3%) 
Source of inside information/principal 34 (50%) 5 (35.7%) 
Did defendant or tipper trade on information?   
Yes 42 (60.9%) 9 (64.3%) 
No 27 (39.1%) 5 (35.7%) 
Did defendant tip others on the information?   
Yes 53 (76.8%) 11 (78.6%) 
No 16 (23.2%)   3 (21.4%) 
Tippee's relationship to tipper   
Acquaintance 1 (1.8%) 0 (0%) 
Business associate 18 (32.7%) 7 (58.3%) 
Close personal friend 27(49.1%) 5 (41.7%) 
Family member 9 (16.4%) 0 (0%) 
Purpose of breach by defendant or tipper   
Direct financial benefit to tipper 52 (80%) 10 (100.0%) 
Reputational benefit to tipper   2 (3.1%)   0 (0%) 
Gift of confidential information to tippee 11 (16.9%)   0 (0%) 
Tipper's knowledge of tippee's intent to use inside information (tipper 
Mens Rea) 
  
Tipper knew that tippee would trade on information (knowledge) 47 (87.0%) 11 (91.7%) 
Tipper knew that tippee may or was likely to trade on information 
(recklessness) 
  2 (3.7%)  0 (0%) 
 Tipper should have known that tippee would use information 
(negligence) 
  0 (0%)  0 (0%) 
Tipper did not know that tippee would use the information   5 (9.3%)  1 (8.3%) 
Tippee's Knowledge of tipper's Breach of Duty (tippee Mens Rea)   
Tippee knew that tipper breached his duty by disclosing information 
(knowledge) 
49 (90.7%) 8 (72.7) 
Tippee deliberately avoided knowing whether tipper breached his 
duty by disclosing information (recklessness) 
0 (0%) 1 (9.1%) 
Tippee should've known, had reason to know, or had a general 
understanding that tipper was disclosing information for personal 
benefit (negligence)  
5 (9.3%) 1 (9.1%) 
Tippee did not know that tipper obtained personal benefit in 
exchange for disclosing information 
0 (0%) 1 (9.1%) 
Settlement with SEC   
Yes 24 (34.8%) 2 (50%) 
Pending 45 (65.2%) 1 (25%) 
No 0 (0%) 1 (25%) 
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Table 2. Contingency Table. Trading Activity of tipper by Purpose of Breach 
 
Purpose of Breach by Defendant or tipper 
Did defendant or tipper trade on the information? 
No Yes Total 
Direct financial benefit to tipper 25.8% (16) 74.2% (46) 100.00% (62) 
Reputational benefit to tipper 100.00% (2) 0% (0) 100.00% (2) 
Gift of confidential information to tippee 90.9% (10) 9.1% (1) 100.00% (11) 
Total  37.3% (28) 62.7% (47) 100% (75) 
    
Chi-Square 20.374
***
   
*** 
p<.001    
Note: Information in the parenthesis indicates frequencies in each category.  
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Table 3. Contingency Table. Tipping Activity by tippee’s Relationship to tipper 
 
Tippee’s relationship to tipper 
Did defendant tip others on the information? 
No Yes Total 
Acquaintance 100.00% (1) 0% (0) 100.00% (1) 
Business associate 12% (3) 88% (22) 100.00% (25) 
Close personal friend 6.3% (2) 93.7% (30) 100.00% (32) 
Family member 0% (0) 100.00% (9) 100.00% (9) 
Total  9.0% (6) 91.00% (61) 100% (67) 
    
Chi-Square 11.623
**
   
** 
p<.01    
Note: Information in the parenthesis indicates frequencies in each category.  
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Table 4. T-test Comparison of Means for SEC Civil Enforcement Proceedings and 
Securities Fraud Criminal Litigation from 2012-2014 (N=83) 
Variables Civil 
Enforcement 
(N=69) 
Criminal 
Litigation 
(N=14) 
Amount of Settlement by Defendant/Tipper/s (in U.S. 
Dollars)a 
$2,506,450.00 $400.00 
Amount of Settlement by Tippee/s (in U.S. Dollars)a $4,141,626.23** $33,020,825.00** 
Total Amount of Settlement (in U.S. Dollars)a $4,405,648.38 $16,510,612.50 
Amount of Profit of Defendant/Tipper (in U.S. Dollars)a $5,126,254.60* $27,107,391.40* 
Amount of Profit by Tippeea $12,186,861.60 $54,495,239.38 
Total Amount of Profita $11,250,063.74* $43,961,451.70* 
Amount of Judgment/Penalty (U.S.$)a $26,472,576.21 $16,486,637.86 
Length of Imprisonment (in months) 0 98 
a
T-test comparison of means 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
  
 
 
Page 33 of 33 Journal of Financial Crime
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
